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Future State 2 - Working Paper 11/07 
  
Future State 2 is a research project being undertaken on behalf of state services chief executives as 
part of the Emerging Issues Programme (EIP). The project aims to identify how the ‘centre’ can 
support new ways of working that are required for the public sector to respond effectively to emerging 
complex problems, and how individual agencies could promote new ways of working. There are 
several strands to this work: 1) international perspectives, 2) emerging trends in governance, 3) joint 
accountability, 4) experimentation and learning in policy implementation, 5) skills and capabilities 6) 
agency restructuring,, and 7) the authorising environment.  
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Future State 2: Strand 71
Authorising Environment: Mapping Role Designation and Practice in the 
New Zealand Model 
  
A review of the New Zealand literature by Elizabeth Eppel 
Introduction 
The starting proposition for the Authorising Environment strand is that reform of public 
management system to date has been a one way street. By and large reform has focused on 
how public organisations set, manage and report their performance, paying insufficient 
attention to the role of the authorising environment, such as ministers, parliament and the 
media. Recent international analyses of public management reform identify authorising 
agents as the ‘missing piece’ in system design and performance, emphasising, for example, 
the formal role of politicians and legislators in setting performance criteria and their absence 
of understanding and inconsistent levels of utilisation. It is taken for granted that public 
sector reform revolves around both normative and descriptive suppositions that the signals 
sent by authorising agents matter within the design and operation of public management 
systems, and yet we know precious little about how this part of the system actually works. 
The authorising environment is an ongoing project2
This paper is part of the initial phase of the project: a literature review on what is already 
known about the role expectations of the key authorising agents – ministers – in the New 
, which explores the missing link in 
systemic public management reform: the role expectations for ministers and the question of 
what should (or can) be done to modify the way ministers and legislators engage with the 
public management systems that they have installed. This is about both better alignment (by 
clarifying the expectations of authorising agents and the fit with what public organisations 
do) and stronger engagement (by examining what can be done to increase conformance by 
authorising agents with the systemic expectations that they themselves have set).  
                                               
1  Future State 2 is a research project undertaken on behalf of state services chief executives as part of the Emerging Issues 
Programme (EIP). The project aimed to identify how the ‘centre’ can support new ways of working that are required for the public sector to 
respond effectively to emerging complex problems, and how individual agencies could promote new ways of working. There are several 
strands to this work: 1) International perspective, 2) Emerging trends in governance, 3) Joint accountability, 4) Experimentation and 
learning in policy implementation, 5) Agency restructuring, 6) Skills and capabilities, 7) Authorising environment. 
 
2  The principal investigators are Michael DiFrancesco (the Australia and New Zealand School of Government and Elizabeth Eppel 
(Victoria University of Wellington). 
3 
 
Zealand public management system. The focus has been on the ‘performance’ framework 
governing minister-chief executive relations, and has confirmed that this area is under-
researched. In the second stage of the project this New Zealand research literature will be 
placed in the context of the international literature on ministerial role expectations and public 
management design, as a first step in scoping a research question for empirical study. 
New Zealand Literature 
In the New Zealand model as designed and implemented through legislation (the State Sector 
Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989) and the Cabinet Office Manual, there is a 
separation of the roles of Ministers as direction setter and the bureaucrats as the 
implementers. By convention the public service departments are expected to provide ‘free 
and frank’ advice (Boston, 1991). Chapman and Duncan (2007) identify four subsequent 
events which have led to some modifications to the model: the change in the electoral system 
from first-past-the-post (FPP) to the mixed member proportional (MMP) system in 1996; the 
changing role of the State Services Commission; the the Schick report (Schick, 1996); and 
the formation of the Labour-led coalition government in 1999. Their arguments in relation to 
the changes arising from these events are discussed in turn. 
First, Chapman and Duncan (2007) note the change in chief executives performance 
agreements to require recognition of the ‘collective interest’ of government as one of the 
responses to the sense among ministers in the 1990s that 1988/89 reforms had led to 
departments acting in isolation, leading to a one-dimensional approach and poor co-
ordination. As a response to the challenges of managing a coalition, and often minority, 
government formed after MMP, Chapman and Duncan note the increasing practice of the use 
of advisers on ministers’ offices ‘with a personal loyalty to the minister’ or the party, who 
might be involved in negotiating between the lead party in government and other parties, to 
enable legislation to be passed, and have taken on tasks of policy co-ordination which might 
formerly have been the role of government departments.  
Given the radical nature of the 1988/89 state sector reforms, the State Services Commissioner 
of the early 1990s focused on making the new departmental chief executives fully responsible 
for the resources (human, financial and physical) and operations of their departments, using 
remuneration, performance management and relationships with ministers. According to 
Chapman and Duncan, ‘the emphasis on chief executive, as opposed to departmental 
performance, led to a loss of centralized, co-ordinated direction of government departments’ 
(2007, p. 8). In the early 1990s, SSC’s focus was not on wider management issues across 
government, and ‘management styles were largely driven by the financial aspects of 
management, as determined by the Treasury’ (p. 8). In the late 1990s, SSC began to shift its 
focus to ‘broader strategic issues and the capacity of departments to provide relevant strategic 
advice and implement such policies’ (p. 9). The State Services Commissioner also advocated 
for a wider mandate to cover non-departmental state agencies, and wider functions were 
recognized in changes made to the State Sector Act in 2004. This opened the way for SSC to 
take a strategic sectoral overview whereby, for example, a whole of education perspective 
might be taken and include not just the Ministry of Education but also the other state agencies 
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carrying out more specific functions in that sector (NZQA, Career Services, Skill NZ and 
later TEC). 
Schick’s (1996) critique of the 1988/89 reforms highlighted issues of co-ordination across 
departments and the effects of the emphasis on quantitative outputs rather than outcomes. 
When the Labour-led government was elected in 1999, they focused on what they had seen as 
the excesses of corporate extravagance in government departments and the state sector 
generally and announced a Review of the Centre to achieve a better integrated, people-
focused service delivery; address fragmentation and alignment issues; and enhance the people 
and culture of the public sector. In addition there were changes in the way the State Services 
Commissioner managed chief executive performance, which became less focused on hard 
documentation and more use was made of the views of a range of stakeholders and the 
minister (Chapman & Duncan, 2007; Hitchiner & Gill, 2011; Wyn, 2007). 
The effects of these events on the minister-chief executive relationship are picked up in 
Wyn’s (2007) portrayal of the relationship between ministers and chief executives in the 
context of the longer historical development of the public service in New Zealand. She 
identifies stages of evolution from ministers having extensive involvement in administration, 
to a more unified and independent public service, to managerialism and contractualism and 
finally a return to a more unified and better integrated public service which pertains in 2011 
(see Table 1).  
Table1: Development of the public service and impact on minister-chief executive 
relationship (Wyn, 2007, p. 54–55). 
Period Minister-chief executive 
relationship 
Impact 
Pre 1912   
Age of ministers as 
administrators 
• Public servants work directly 
to the instructions of ministers 
• Portfolio ministers control 
administrative management of 
departments, including 
appointments, pay and 
discipline 
• Department administered 
separately – no common 
policies or standards 
• Political patronage 
• Low moral 
• Poor performance 
• Hunt commission established 
to review options for change 
 
1912-mid 1980s   
Birth of the professional public 
service 
• Office of the public services 
Commissioner established 
1912, with responsibility for 
efficiency of the public 
services and also 
administrative management, 
including making 
appointments and setting pay. 
• Introduction of common 
practices and standard 
conditions between 
departments 
• Unified, independent career 
public service 
• Non-partisan, non-political 
• Public servants able to take the 
long view 
• Rules govern procedures 
• Over time public service grew 
to be perceived by some as 
unresponsive to the wishes of 
government. 
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• Appointments made from 
within the service, and based 
on merit. 
 
Official Information Act (1982) 
• Facilitates more open policy 
processes 
• Encourages officials to think 
hard before they commit 
anything to writing. 
 
 
 
 
• Limits free and frank 
exchange where advice may 
not be accepted if ministers 
may be shown to be acting 
contrary to advice received 
• May encourage more verbal 
advice, bringing into 
question the impartiality of 
the advice offered 
• Minister may require advice 
to be written in a certain 
way. 
Mid 1980s to 1999   
Age of managerialism State-owned Enterprises Act 1986 
• Public trading organisations 
corporatised and managed by a 
chief executive (CE) 
accountable to a minister 
through a board. 
 
State Sector Act 1988 
• Underlined the primacy of the 
relationship between minister 
and CE 
• CE responsibility for 
administration, and 
Departments constituted as 
separate organisations for 
employment and remuneration 
purposes 
• CE performance reviewed by 
SSC and minister 
• CE appointed on fixed-term 
rather than as a permanent 
head 
• CE accountable for outputs , 
minister responsible for 
outcomes 
 
Public Finance Act 1989 
• CE responsible for financial 
management and financial 
performance of department 
• New financial management 
procedures 
• Outputs/outcomes 
measurement focus. 
 
• Reduced shareholding 
minister’s responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Destroyed concept of a unified 
public service 
• Reduced anonymity of top 
public servants through a more 
open appointment process 
• Set relationship between 
minister and CEs off in 
different directions (letting 
managers manage and freeing 
ministers from day-to-day 
management detail). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Improved reporting and 
financial accountability. 
 
2000 onwards   
Age of reunification and 
integrated service delivery 
Review of the centre 2001 
(recommendations) 
• Reduce fragmentation of the 
human resource framework of 
• Potential conflict of ministerial 
and CE responsibility for 
outcomes 
• Minister-CE relationship still 
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the public service 
• Improve alignment of policy 
goals and enhance 
collaboration between 
departments, and between 
central and local government. 
• Integrate service delivery to 
the public 
 
Managing for outcomes 2001 
• CEs responsible for outcomes 
 
Public Finance Act 2004 
 
primary but joint ministerial 
teams could introduce strains 
on this 
• CEs still responsible for 
management of their 
departments but within a 
framework of public service-
wide standards and 
qualifications 
• Renewed focus on service to 
public needs reinforcement of 
doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility 
• Focus of CEs shifts to longer 
term. 
 
The State Sector Act 1988 is often referred to as one of the most important constitutional 
measures enacted in New Zealand (e.g. Walsh, 1991). The Labour government elected in 
1984 believed that the policies of the previous Labour government had been ‘thwarted by 
senior public servants, used to and comfortable with the long established policies’ of the 
pervious long serving National government (Walsh, 1991, p. 52). Further economic 
arguments for the changes were set out in a Treasury briefing in 1984 (The Treasury, 1984) 
and were focused on the efficiency and effectiveness of government management structures 
and processes, among other things, by applying labour market regulation similar to that 
applying to the private sector (see for example Scott, Bushnell, & Sallee, 1990). Others have 
made more of the links to agency theory which featured in the Treasury’s analysis and are 
particularly critical of its reductionist framing as inappropriate for the complex outputs and 
influence on outcomes expected of government agencies and the multiple accountabilities of 
chief executives (Boston, 1991a; Norman, 2003; Whitcombe, 1990).  
The State Sector Act 1988 significantly changed the procedures for appointing the heads of 
government departments, and appraising their performance. They became chief executives, 
with a fixed term employment contract of up to five years, and changes to powers and 
responsibilities made them accountable for the efficiency and outputs of their departments. 
Appointments to chief executive positions are made by the State Services Commissioner, 
who is the official employer in terms of the Act after following a process prescribed by the 
Act. First the State Services Commissioner must consult the appropriate minister when a 
vacancy occurs to ascertain any matters the minister wishes the Commissioner to take into 
account when making the appointment. In practice, advice that an appointment is to be made 
and matters to be taken into consideration are likely to be considered and confirmed by 
Cabinet. The Commissioner then establishes a panel consisting of the Commissioner, the 
Deputy Commissioner and others as determined by the Commissioner, which makes the 
selection of the new chief executive. When the Commissioner has completed the selection 
process, the minister must again be advised of the name and qualifications of the person to be 
appointed and must refer the appointment to Governor-General in Council for its 
confirmation, before the Commissioner can make the appointment. The Cabinet Office 
Manual provides guidance to ministers on the procedures: 
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Appointment of chief executives 
3.22  The State Services Commissioner’s role in appointing chief executives and the 
independence of chief executives in matters concerning their employees underpin the neutrality of 
the public service. 
3.23  The process of selecting most public service chief executives is managed by the State 
Services Commissioner, in accordance with Part III of the State Sector Act 1988. The 
Commissioner’s recommendation is subject to confirmation by the Governor-General in Council, 
following consideration by Cabinet. Conditions of employment for chief executives are determined 
by agreement between the State Services Commissioner and the chief executive, subject to the 
agreement of the Prime Minister and the Minister of State Services. 
There is provision for the Governor-General in Council to decline to approve an appointment, 
in which case an alternative named person must be substituted and notice of their 
appointment published in the New Zealand Gazette. Boston observes that this step makes any 
political appointment evident, and there has been only one occasion in 1990 where the 
government did not support the Commissioner’s recommended appointment (Boston, 2001, 
p. 201). 
According to s. 32 of the Act, the chief executive is responsible to the appropriate minister 
for carrying out the functions and duties of the department, providing advice to the minister, 
the conduct of the department, and the efficient, effective and economical management of the 
department. A specific exception is made on specific matters regarding individual employees, 
where the chief executive is bound to act independently of the minister (s. 33 "State Sector 
Act," 1988). 
The Act sets out matters to be taken into account by the Commissioner when selecting chief 
executives for appointment: 
S. 35 (12) In deciding upon the person to be appointed as chief executive of a Department, the 
Commissioner or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, shall have regard to the 
need to appoint a person who— 
(a) can discharge the specific responsibilities placed on that chief executive; and 
(b) will imbue the employees of the Department with a spirit of service to the community; and 
(c) will promote efficiency in the Department; and  
(d) will be a responsible manager of the Department; and 
(e) will maintain appropriate standards of integrity and conduct among the employees of the 
Department; and 
(f) will ensure that the Department is a good employer; and 
(g) will promote equal employment opportunities. 
Once a chief executive is appointed, the Commissioner is responsible to the appropriate 
minister for reviewing the performance of the chief executive and reporting to the minister on 
the manner and the extent to which the chief executive is carrying out the requirements of 
their position. A tripartite relationship therefore is formed between the chief executive of a 
core public service department, the Minister responsible for the portfolio(s), and the State 
Services Commissioner (Gill, 2011; Lodge & Gill, 2011). The State Services Commissioner 
is the formal employer, and reviewer of the performance of chief executives. 
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According to Hitchiner and Gill (2011), the practice of chief executive performance 
management has tended to vary with each State Services Commissioner. In the 1990s, there 
was a formal chief executive performance agreement. These became less effective 
instruments for the complexity of the CE role as it evolved over time, and formal 
performance agreements for chief executives were abandoned in 2002. ‘Output delivery 
expectations set out in [departmental] Output Plans have formed an increasingly small part of 
the chief executive review process in comparison to other matters of interest’ (Hitchener & 
Gill, 2011, p. 84) – such as the chief executive’s success in managing a “two-way 
relationship” in which the minister and chief executive agreed to a set of “clear and 
achievable expectations and priorities” (Ryan, Gill, & Dormer, 2011, p. 292).  
Operational modifications which occurred after the review undertaken by Schick (1996) and 
the Review of the Centre furthered this evolution (State Services Commission, 2002). Lodge 
and Gill (2011) refers to the evolution of the public sector bargain that was struck through the 
changes made by the State Sector Act. In the original version of the bargain, chief executives 
accepted fixed tenure and ministerial performance expectations in exchange for freedom to 
manage how departmental resources were deployed to achieve their outputs, and rewards and 
tools more akin to those available in the private sector. This bargain was modified such that 
while chief executive are still appointed for fixed terms of up to five years and may have their 
contracts extended, the maximum term is generally around eight years. There have been a 
number of changes addressing issues of departmental fragmentation and duplication, which 
have imposed requirements for chief executives to work more co-operatively to achieve 
operational efficiencies and also more focus on outcomes which tend to be broader than the 
scope of a single department. This activity has also resulted in recentralisation of some 
functions into larger departments, such as the Ministry of Social Development which has 
absorbed the formerly independent Child, Youth and Family, and Work and Income; the 
Ministry of Education which absorbed the formerly independent Special Education Services 
and Early Childhood units; and Internal Affairs which has absorbed Archives and National 
Library .The effect of these organisational structure changes has been to make the functions 
of departments and their accountabilities even more complex, leaving the agency theory 
doctrine of separation of functions in the past (see for example Whitcombe, 2008). While it 
has been argued by Gill (2008) that the net change in the number of public sector agencies 
had been minimal, the trend to reduction by combining functions in a single agency is 
continuing at the time of writing. 
The employment and accountability relationship of chief executives has been called a 
menage-a-trois in which one party (the State Services Commissioner) is the formal employer, 
but the chief executive is held to be responsible to another (their portfolio minister(s)). A 
former State Services Commissioner referred to the arrangement where ‘employed by’ and 
‘works for’ are not synonymous as most unusual. Despite the tensions inherent in this 
unusual triangle, several note the resistance of the chief executive role to politicization (e.g. 
Chapman & Duncan, 2007; Lodge & Gill, 2011).  
While descriptions of the formal minister-chief executive relationship are easy to find (e.g. 
Boston, 1991b; Gill, 2011), and observers have drawn conclusions about the way these 
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relationships operate at a macro-trend level, there is surprisingly little empirically derived 
information about the detail and variability of how these formal relationships operate in 
practice. It has been suggested that it depends to a large extent on the individuals involved. A 
fundamental assumption at the heart of the relationship is an understanding that the role of 
the minister is to set the political directions and priorities and that the chief executive will use 
the resources at their disposal to achieve the goals of the minister and the government, and 
will be held accountable for their achievement, through the agency of the State Services 
Commissioner. We know little of whether this assumption holds in practice and how. 
Empirically-based observations of how these relationships are enacted in practice is scarce 
and patchy, often the result of researching a related area such as organizational performance 
rather than as a direct result of research focus on the minister-chief executive relationship and 
the authorizing environment per se. The little that has been found is discussed below. 
Shortly after the enactment of the State Sector Act 1988, Whitcombe surveyed and 
interviewed a group of chief executives who had participated in the first performance review 
process for chief executives appointed under the new Act (Whitcombe, 1990). The intention 
of how the performance expectation-setting and review process would operate had been 
articulated (Scott & Gorringe, 1989; The Treasury, 1987) and the research aim was to 
investigate the practice. While six participants found the review process useful, this was less 
than a third. Reasons given included: it provided a framework for focusing on the end result; 
it gave feedback on how the CE was doing in the job and a clear idea of what the Minister 
thinks; it imposed a discipline to produce results and also showed up shortcomings in the 
performance agreement. Those who had a mixed reaction found the process did not focus on 
the right areas or ask the right questions and there were difficulties where there had been a 
change of minister. CEs negative about the process criticized the poor paper work, 
superficiality, failure to focus in depth on critical areas, and the failure to tell them anything 
they did not already know therefore adding no value for the time devoted to the process. 
Whitcombe’s conclusions focused on the operability of a pure agency theory-based model in 
the face of changing priorities and multiple accountabilities. The relevance of this research 
has been overtaken by the move after 2002 away from specific performance agreements 
towards departmental Statements of Intent and letters of expectations exchanged between the 
Commissioner and chief executives to identify areas for particular chief executive focus.  
James (2002) described the nexus between ministers and their departmental chief executives 
as ‘the heart of government’ and ‘crucial to good government’. This relationship is imbued 
with three constitutional conventions: individual ministerial responsibility; collective cabinet 
responsibility; and public service loyalty, neutrality and anonymity. These constitutional 
conventions underpin the arrangements set out in the State Sector Act which create a 
boundary between the chief executive and the minister. James used a series of workshops 
with public servants and ministers to explore that boundary which he says was variously 
described as strategy and outcomes versus management, administration and outputs; political 
versus technical; and defending government policy versus explaining it. He called the 
boundary porous in that it changes according to circumstances and time. It is also very private 
and specific to the individuals involved in the minister-chief executive relationship. James 
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concluded that the conventions of ministerial responsibility and collective cabinet 
responsibility, while undergoing adjustments brought about by MMP and minority 
governments, still held. However, the conventions of loyalty, neutrality and anonymity, he 
concluded, were under strain. This was a result of increased pressure on public servants to 
front select committees and the media to ‘explain’ government programmes and answer for 
the success or failure of these programmes to select committees. It also reflects the 
requirements of the Official Information Act which routinely puts the advice tendered by 
public servants to ministers into the public domain. It was seen as increasingly difficult for 
any CE and their senior staff to maintain low profile anonymity, especially when the policies 
being administered are contentious in the eyes of the public. 
Daly (2002) examined the principle of political neutrality and its operation. She observed that 
much of the power exercised by the public service comes from the policy advice role. 
Further, if the relationship between ministers and the public service breaks down, then the 
democratically elected component of government loses its ability to govern and the 
component of government chosen for its competencies in advising on and implementing 
decisions loses its legitimacy. She suggests that the risk of departments developing a political 
agenda is reduced by shorter appointment periods for chief executives. “When you are 
minister of an area that you know very little about, your department tends to continue in the 
same direction they had been going under the previous government. In this situation, they 
lead the minister, not the minister leading them. This is when you become wary of public 
servants following an internal culture” (Ministerial interview 2002 quoted by Daly, 2002, p. 
12). Daly suggests that the principle of anonymity complements neutrality because the chief 
executive and the department are then extensions of the minister. Loss of anonymity, which 
for example occurred in the Cave Creek and Work and Income cases, threatens public 
perceptions of political neutrality and according to Daly, the State Sector Act has increased 
the potential for politicization of the chief executive and public service roles. Others believe 
that this has not occurred to any significant extent (e.g. Lodge & Gill, 2011). 
The theme of public trust and confidence and its relationship with organisational performance 
was explored more deeply by Wyn (2007) in a case study of organisational culture change in 
the Department of Corrections and the Police. Wyn identified organisational performance as 
a necessary precursor of public perceptions of trust and confidence in a department, a 
proposition supported in the international literature. She noted the role of portfolio ministers 
and the prime minister in supporting CE attempts to improve organisational performance by 
expressing their expectations of the department and their trust and confidence in the 
department to perform. However, where minister’s trust and confidence is shaken to the 
extent that they express publicly their lack of confidence in their department or their 
department chief executive, then this undermines and works against any attempt by the chief 
executive to change performance to be more in line with expectations. Highly operational 
coercive departments such as Police and Corrections, according to Wyn, require public trust 
and confidence to be able to operate effectively. However she also cites examples which 
demonstrate how vulnerable such departments are to having public trust and confidence 
undermined by publicly reported incidents of poor performance. She observes that a vicious 
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cycle can easily be created in which the reporting of incidents is compounded with each new 
incident and public confidence is rapidly eroded even when, taken as a whole through some 
more objective measure, overall organisation performance might be on an improving trend. If 
public confidence is badly enough eroded over time then the minister finds themselves in the 
position of needing to give voice to the public disquiet, rather than remaining silent or 
expressing confidence, thereby undermining the efforts of their chief executive to achieve the 
culture change the Minister wants. When a minister expresses dissatisfaction with a 
department, then that can act as a strong motivator for the department to do better, but 
simultaneously they undermine the CE’s attempts to do so. 
A series of case studies on organizational performance management in particular departments 
also throw some light on chief executive-minister relationships (see for example Dormer, 
2010; Gill, 2011; Norman, 2003). Dormer’s PhD research (2010) used semi structured 
interviews to examine the performance management systems in two departments – Child 
Youth and Family, the Public Prisons Service and Community Probation Service, the latter 
two both within the Department of Corrections. The Gill (2011) volume contains cases based 
on Child, Youth and Family, Conservation, Corrections, Work and Income, Women’s 
Affairs, Transport agencies, and Justice sector agencies. Complex outcomes and multiple 
accountabilities make the measurement of performance a difficult task, further compounded 
by the diversity of functions performed, differing perspectives on the functions and their 
relative importance and the purpose of the performance information (e.g. accountability, 
planning, improvement). 
A consistent comment found in the various case studies concerns the intrinsic, non-explicit 
rather than formal nature of the means by which ministers convey their wishes – summed up 
by a minister interviewed by Dormer: ‘no one in their right minds thinks that we use [the 
formal accountability documents] to manage performance’ (Dormer, 2010, p. 15). Norman 
(2003) also noted the informal nature of the processes: ‘Trust matters more than anything else 
in the relationship between the chief executives of policy ministries and ministers. 
Documentation doesn’t help build such trust and can get in the way of building this’ … ‘the 
real substance of accountability to the minister does not come through formal processes and 
documents, but through weekly meeting and informal exchanges. The formal system is only 
relevant where there are problems’ (Norman, 2003, p. 147). 
Two cases often raised in discussion of chief executive-minister accountability and 
responsibility are the Cave Creek disaster, where a viewing platform erected by the 
Department of Conservation collapsed causing the deaths of 14 students; and the Cabinet 
decision to move the Department of Work and Income into the Ministry of Social 
Development and the related decision not to reappoint the existing chief executive of the 
department of Work and Income. In the former case, an egregious operational failure did not 
lead to the immediate resignation of either the Minister responsible for the Conservation 
portfolio or the chief executive, both of whom accepted responsibility, but also said they 
needed to remain in office to ensure that systems were changed to prevent further tragedy. 
The official enquiry into the incident noted that although the platform had collapsed because 
it was not constructed using sound building practices, the department was struggling to 
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manage within a constrained budget, thus sharing some of the responsibility with the minister 
and the political system that makes resource allocation decisions. In the Work and Income 
case, the chief executive had been criticized for her management style and corporate spending 
by the Prime Minister and the minister, while in opposition. When they achieved government, 
both PM and minister expressed reservations about whether the chief executive could provide 
the policy and outcome leadership they were looking for. The structural change to abolish the 
department meant that the chief executive position no longer existed. A case brought by the 
chief executive to challenge her non reappointment was lost (Wallis, 2001). 
Collectively, the empirical studies all tend towards an observation that operational 
departments have a particularly hard row to hoe, in that single operational incidents which 
catch media and public attention tend to shape perceptions of performance, and negatively 
affect the climate for improved performance (e.g. Dormer, 2010; Wyn, 2007). Dormer (2010) 
commented that the role of ministers often strays beyond the setting of strategic direction and 
priorities and into the managerial responsibilities of the CE. In the case of Police and 
Corrections, the minister has taken a firm directive stance on her expectations regarding the 
culture and performance of the organisations and has shown little tolerance for operational 
mishaps (Wyn, 2007). Notwithstanding, the use the language of outputs and outcomes, 
performance measurement and management both within individual agencies and, at times, by 
ministers and their advisors in central agencies, continues to focus on procedural 
management and the control of inputs (e.g. Gill, 2011; Lodge & Gill, 2011). 
Since 2000, the State Services Commission has modified their process for reviewing chief 
executive performance, which goes hand in hand with their review of departmental 
performance. Lodge and Gill (2011) refered to a “move from hard-edged contractualism of 
purchase agreements to softer-edged relationships involved in output plans, as well as the 
introduction of ‘Statements of Intent’” ... [SSC] ‘increased the emphasis on feedback for 10 
to 20 internal and external "stakeholders" to complement the minister's views.' "Nevertheless, 
the relationship with the minister remained central: ‘They get 10-20 references, what matters 
is the view of the minister’; ‘you either have the confidence of the minister or not’. One chief 
executive suggested that ‘if you make one big mistake, but [otherwise] performed beautifully 
and did something really innovative, you'd still end up without your bonus’ ...a further noted 
"if you perform, you get a certain amount. If you perform exceptionally, you get a little bit 
more. If you perform badly, you get a little bit less. But it doesn't really make a difference". 
Commenting on how the system has evolved over the years, Hitchener and Gill concluded 
that ‘regardless of the internal structure of the State Services Commission and priorities of the 
Commissioner, sanctions for poor performance by the chief executive or their departments 
(however assessed) have tended to be applied behind the scenes. An inherent tension exists 
between expectations of accountability and transparency and the requirement for privacy and 
respect for human dignity. Opaqueness in the employment relationship is inevitable if the 
commissioner is to behave lawfully as a good employer, and the relationship with the chief 
executives is to be based on trust and respect for the privacy and professionalism of the 
individual chief executives’ (Hitchener & Gill, 2011, p. 84).  
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Parliament, particularly through the role of Select Committees, is also an important agent of 
the authorizing environment in which chief executives and their departments operate. Prebble 
(2010) provides a comprehensive discussion of how Parliament interacts with the executive 
and the judiciary based on constitutional theory and practical examples. Drawing upon this 
source, Hitchiner and Gill see little evidence of parliament using output-based, capability-
based or outcome performance information to actively scrutinize the executive. Furthermore, 
ministers do not appear to seek or rely on comprehensive (or even high level) performance 
information –‘In practice, parliament and ministers do not reward transparency’ (Hitchener & 
Gill, 2011, p. 92). 
The New Zealand public management system has evolved further since the change of 
government in 2008 and the pressures created by the global financial crisis. There is little 
systematic documentation of the nature of these changes, their effects, and new practices 
which are evolving as the system adapts to these changes. The Minister of Finance refers to a 
‘new responsibility model’ the government has chosen to use as its tool for managing its 
fiscal response to the financial crisis (English, 2011). This model, English says, ‘requires 
ministers and chief executives to clarify exactly what results they want. We are using the 
basic tools of ministerial and chief executive accountability, and thus spend a good deal of 
time ensuring that discussion between the Prime Minister and his ministers exactly reflects 
these expectations over the next two or three years.... We believe strongly in an alignment of 
political and administrative expectations. The process of ensuring the Prime Minister and 
ministers are clear about their expectations and performance is something we value strongly. 
It is a process that takes time to build momentum; a culture of caution and risk management 
in our public sector has become deeply embedded in the decade. As ministers, we must keep 
demonstrating political support for change and reinforcing the mandate that chief executives 
can use tools and make changes without fear of political consequences.’ (English, 2011, p. 
57).  
In three successive budgets, the government has challenged chief executives and the public 
sector to do more with the same or reduced budgets. In this environment, more pressure has 
come on chief executives individually and collectively to be innovative in the way the public 
sector works to achieve government priorities. The government has maintained firm oversight 
of the 10 departments responsible for 80% of government spending as a means of ensuring 
that the fiscal targets the government has set itself are met (English, 2011). One trend in this 
period has been the reinforcement by ministers of the formation of informal collectives of 
chief executives to provide leadership and coherency to the actions of individual departments 
when dealing with complex issues. Examples of these include the ‘justice sector CEs 
(Ministry of Justice, Police, Department of Corrections) who are looked to by ministers to 
find solutions to priority areas for government such as high offending rates, and offending 
while on parole. The social sector chief executives (Ministry of Social Development, Health, 
Education) have led work on preventing family violence.  
In the literature reviewed, there is very little evidence of the way ministers play their 
executive role with respect to their portfolios. Informal communications during 2011 in the 
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course of the Future State 23
Conclusion 
 research have referred to letters of expectations from the Prime 
Minister to individual ministers, setting out the priorities of the government in each portfolio, 
which are then reported on and updated six-monthly. It has also been suggested that these 
letters are mirrored by letters between the State Services Commissioner and the relevant chief 
executives. Such attempts by government and ministers to play a stronger and more directive 
role in setting the strategic agenda and articulating expectations might represent an attempt to 
set important parameters on the chief executives’ authorizing environment, but there is little 
systematic collection of evidence of how these new mechanisms are operating. The words of 
the Minister of Finance indicate that New Zealand’s current government is determined to 
provide an aligned and strong strategic leadership to public sector CEOs: ‘we probably need 
to rethink how cabinets work in order to achieve greater ministerial alignment (and reduce 
‘static’). Ministers need to work together to ensure the collaborative and cooperative delivery 
of services takes place.... At present the only powerful tool for achieving closer alignment is 
that ministers are ultimately accountable to the Prime Minister, who has the power to sack 
them. But modern cabinets require more than this punitive sanction to make them work 
effectively’ (English, 2011, p. 58). 
Assumptions about the respective roles, relationships and expectations of ministers and chief 
executives stem from the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989 and the 
conventions codified in the Cabinet Office Manual. The research material reviewed here 
would suggest that there is a gap in our understanding of how these roles, relationships and 
expectations are enacted in practice, given that there has been no systematic attempt to do this 
over the 22 years the Acts have been in place. Clearly practice has evolved over that 22 years 
and there is a great deal of variation affected not least by the personalities involved. 
Moreover, under the pressures created by the global financial crisis, the government is 
currently considering how it most effectively plays its strategic leadership role. As the 
Minister of Finance puts it, the current system is very strong on accountability for money but 
not so on accountability for results. Given the knowledge gap between the formal system 
articulated in the Acts and the informal practice, what are ‘legitimate’ expectations about a 
genuine managerial role (and hence behaviours) of ministers? How do the strategic and 
managerial instruments of government support these roles? A more systematic enquiry might 
reveal some important insights into the performance of our public management system and 
inform any attempts to improve it. 
 
                                               
3  Future State 2 is a research project undertaken on behalf of state services chief executives as part of 
the Emerging Issues Programme (EIP). The project aimed to identify how the ‘centre’ can support new ways of 
working that are required for the public sector to respond effectively to emerging complex problems, and how 
individual agencies could promote new ways of working. There are several strands to this work: 1) 
International perspective, 2) Emerging trends in governance, 3) Joint accountability, 4) Experimentation and 
learning in policy implementation, 5) Agency restructuring, 6) Skills and capabilities, 7) Authorising 
environment. 
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